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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The existence or absence of this authority depended upon the
provisions of a long and detailed agreement. The court found
the authority lacking and citing Article 3007 as a basis, said "it is
well settled that an agent has no power to substitute another to
perform duties of his mandate unless expressly or impliedly




"The surety who has paid the debt, has his remedy against
the principal debtor . . . ."' In connection with his general rela-
tionships and responsibilities the surety may also incur other
expenses (apart from principal and interest, and formal legal
costs), and the extent of permissible recovery is the question
which was the issue in Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. St.
Romain.2 As a result of complaint about performance of work
under a plumbing contract and suit filed against the plumbing
contractor and his surety, the latter incurred certain expenses
for telephone, telegram, attorney and adjuster, in the amount of
$167.03. After due examination of the trouble (seepage within
the building), the necessary corrections were made, and the
building owner had its suit dismissed as having been filed in
error because it agreed that the plumbing contractor's work
had been properly performed and that the trouble had been
due to other people's mistakes. In the present case the trial
court and the court of appeal gave judgment for the surety
against the principal, and it is surprising that it was necessary
for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in this case in order
to correct an oversight of the lower court.
It goes without saying that, as long as there is nothing
contrary to public order or a prohibitory law, the surety and
principal can stipulate in their contract what will be the
extent of the surety's indemnification against the principal.
Sometimes this is for "any and all liability, damages, loss, costs,
2. Id. at 554, 70 So.2d at 122.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Art. 3052, LA. CML CODE of 1870.
2. 224 La. 382, 69 So.2d 508 (1953).
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charges and expenses of whatsoever kind or nature, including
counsel and attorney's fees. . .. -3 In the present case, the Su-
preme Court found that the lower court "overlooks the provision
in the indemnity agreement that the reimbursement by the
principal who signed it . . .applies to those losses, costs, ex-
penses, 'resulting from any act, default or neglect of the under-
signed'."'4 Since the surety's expenses in this case did not result
from any act, default or neglect of the principal, but were in-
curred as a result of the building owner's mistake in instituting
a suit which he later had dismissed by reason of his own error
in having filed it, the surety could not recover these expenses
from the principal.
In Ranger Land Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.5 suit
was brought against the surety on the bond of a real estate
broker who had made sales of plaintiff's property without re-
porting or accounting for them. The broker died, leaving an
insolvent succession. Among the surety's contentions were the
arguments that (1) the broker was not acting as agent for
the plaintiff, (2) the surety was not liable in the absence of
proof of dishonesty on the part of broker, and (3) the sale of
timber is not a sale of real estate within the meaning of the real
estate act.6 In affirming the lower court's decision, the court
found that the broker was in fact the plaintiff's agent, asserted
that the surety's liability is not limited to proof of the broker's
dishonesty, and held that, in the light of Act 188 of 19047 and
all the jurisprudence, the term "real estate" in the statute in-
cluded timber.
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION PRIVILEGES
In Laney Co. v. Airline Apartments8 the plaintiff sued for
recovery of the cost of materials furnished to a subcontractor
and for recognition of its privilege. The purchases here involved
were not disputed, but the owner and the contractor defendants
denied that the materials were used in the project. Since the
building contract was not recorded and no bond was given by the
principal contractor, the case is governed by R.S. 9:4812, which
3. Cf. Conway v. Union Indemnity Co., 185 La. 240, 246, 169 So. 73, 75
(1936).
4. 224 La. 382, 390, 69 So.2d 508, 511 (1953).
5. 224 La. 153, 68 So.2d 907 (1953).
6. LA. R.S. 37:1431 et seq., 37:1447 (bond) (1950).
7. LA. R.S. 9:1103 (1950).
8. 223 La. 1000, 67 So.2d 570 (1953).
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establishes the privilege "in favor of any such person who shall
have performed service or labor or delivered material ..
(Italics supplied.) The court held that it is incumbent on the
plaintiff to prove only that the materials were delivered to the
premises, placing the burden then on the defendant to show
that the materials were not used in that project. In the present
case there was evidence of the delivery, and no evidence to the
contrary. The lower court's judgment in favor of plaintiff was
affirmed."
When the building contract is recorded and a contractor's
bond given, the situation is governed by R.S. 9:4801, which
establishes a privilege "for the payment in principal and interest
of such work or labor performed, or materials, machinery, or
fixtures furnished. . . ." (Italics supplied.) The difference in
the word might not seem sufficient to distinguish the situations,
yet it might be argued that the latter term (furnished) would
be satisfied by proof of the sale without necessarily proving
delivery to the premises, thereby making heavier the burden
to disprove the use of the materials in the project.
A somewhat different variation of this problem appeared in
the case of Mayronne Lumber & Supply Co. v. Houston Fire &
Casualty Ins. Co.' The building contract and the bond had been
duly recorded, so the case came under the first sections of the
building contract law; and since the main issue was the liability
of the surety on the bond, the specific statutory provision in-
volved is R.S. 9:4803. This section provides that the surety
"shall be liable in solido with the contractor for all labor and
material used in the said work. . . ." (Italics supplied.) It is
doubtful whether different meanings were intended in each of
these texts, yet it might be wondered whether this richness of
language is best utilized within the same statute. In the pres-
ent case there was no dispute that the plaintiff sold the materials
to the contractor and that they were actually used in the proj-
ect, but the surety tried to disclaim liability for a certain part
of the materials which were first sent to a cabinet-making shop,
for conversion into door frames and so forth, before delivery
to the project site. On the basis of the language in R.S. 9:4803,
the lower court's judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. It would
9. The court cited with approval and quoted from the court of appeal
decision in Hortman-Salmen Co. v. Raymond, 13 La. App. 490, 127 So. 452
(1930).
10. 74 So.2d 198 (La. 1954).
[VOL. XV
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
hardly be expected that there would have been a different
decision if the term in this section were "delivered" or "fur-




There are different kinds of rules of law concerning the
loss or change of rights by reason of the lapse of time, but the
classification and characteristics of each have not been clearly
indicated. In the case of liberative prescription, the running of
the time is subject to interference through interruption and
suspension, and the prescription can be renounced after accrual.
However, in some cases, the running of time brooks no inter-
ference, and after the lapse of the stated period, the right is
completely lost.
In Cassiere v. Cuban Coffee Mills' this question of classifi-
cation of the nature of the prescription was directed at Article
3547 of the Civil Code, which provides that, in the absence of
appropriate revival proceedings, "all judgments for money...
shall be prescribed by the lapse of ten years." Petition to revive
a judgment was filed twenty years after its rendition and was
followed by allegations of interruption and suspension. After
tracing the history of the Civil Code article, and the fluctuating
jurisprudence, the court held that the only way to prevent
accrual of this prescription was by means of an action to revive
the judgment, stating, "[We] think it the wiser policy to regard
Article 3547 as sui generis and we attach no particular impor-
tance to the circumstance that, because it has been placed in
that part of the Civil Code which deals with the liberative
prescription, the articles pertaining to the interruption of pre-
scription are, or should be, applicable."'2
It is sometimes a necessary technique to make a present
policy decision as to which of two conflicting lines of jurispru-
dence should be followed. However, if the statement with ref-
erence to this article is implied for other Civil Code articles,
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 74 So.2d 193 (La. 1954).
2. Id. at 197.
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